The Monster from Elba: Napoleon’s escape reconsidered

By Evan Wilson, published August 2021

Abstract


This article argues that historians have overlooked and underplayed a major British strategic
error, namely that Napoleon’s escape from Elba in February 1815 was a preventable calamity
that put the hard-won victory of the sixth coalition at risk. It had the potential to change the
course of history because the allied victory at Waterloo was by no means assured. All of the allies
bear some portion of the blame for Napoleon’s escape, but none more so than the British, and
especially the Royal Navy, which was the only allied service capable of preventing Napoleon’s
escape. Instead, Lord Castlereagh prioritized coalition politics over Napoleon’s fate, and the
navy prioritized the ongoing War of 1812 and demobilization over Mediterranean security. The
British committed these blunders even though they knew that Napoleon was a flight risk, and
even though the cost of reinforcing Napoleon’s guard was dwarfed by the cost of dealing with
his escape

Join Today To Read The Full Article

Filed under: Atlantic | Napoleonic War
Subjects include: Strategy & Diplomacy

Join Today To Read The Full Article

Join Now

If you are already a member please login here.